Special Sciences (or the disunity of science as a working hypothesis) Fodor 1974

This article doesn't get any easier the more I read it. By the end, I'm always in enough of a daze to wonder if I actually skimmed it instead of reading it closely. He presents his claims for the special sciences with more care than I will ever be capable of, with caveats anticipating arguments that I lack any awareness of, that, given his assumptions, builds an argument I'm not intelligent enough to be able to dispute. How do those silly assumptions could justify such inscrutible care. No reasoned conclusion can end up meaning anything when derived from such a conspicuously relaxed definition of 'law'? And natural kinds? Atleast rigid designators make their affinity for science fiction overt. In the end, I am surprised to see how much I disagree with him given my sympathy for his aims. I just don't feel the need for any guarantee that cognitive science won't be better done by physicists, particularly since the machinery he invokes to prove it oblige me to more assumptions than I am comfortable with. Though the job security would be nice, it isn't worth conceding the existence of objective categories. What do I think? I believe that it is important, valuable and possible to bridge adjacent levels of inquiry (como neurophysiological and psychological accounts of mind). I don't expect that this will result in comprehensible microscopic accounts of gross phenomena, and I don't need objective kinds to believe it, just a recognition of the limits of human attention and comprehension. The contribution of microscopic accounts to understanding at higher levels will be to provide a complete (enough) account of the assumptions on which higher level accounts are based— including when, and to what extent, those assumptions hold. Though I appreciate his effort, I don't think that more can be claimed or needs to be claimed in order for me to proceed confidently or responsibly as a special scientist.